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Against the informed consent argument
for surgeon report cards
David Neil
University of Wollongong, Australia
The publication of outcomes information, or ‘report cards’, for individual
surgeons can be argued for on three distinct grounds. One kind of argument
appeals to healthcare quality, and focuses on the value of individual perform-
ance auditing for patient safety and for an evidence-based approach to best
practice. A second kind of argument constructs the patient as a healthcare
‘consumer’ and appeals to a notion of consumer rights, such that patients
have a right to comparative information about the healthcare products and
services that they consume. Some proponents of this kind of argument believe
that enabling patients to be more informed consumers will introduce productive
market incentives into the healthcare system. A third kind of argument appeals
to respect for patient autonomy and the requirement of informed consent to any
medical intervention. I will refer to these arguments, respectively, as ‘the argu-
ment from quality’, ‘the argument from consumer sovereignty’ and ‘the argu-
ment from informed consent’. In advocating the publication of surgeon-specific
outcomes data, it matters which argument we take to be fundamental, because
the basic rationale for having surgeon-specific report cards has implications for
the form, content and funding of such a system.
With respect to the argument from quality, the literature examining the
effect of public reporting of comparative performance information on health-
care quality presents an increasingly compelling argument that such reporting
is necessary for sustainable quality improvement (Chassin, 2002; Marshall
et al., 2002). From this perspective, the value of surgeon-specific performance
data is that it assists with a sophisticated analysis of the factors contributing to
medical errors. As Mark Chassin (1996) puts it:
Some of the new tools of quality improvement permit us to understand much better
how errors creep into clinical practice. This kind of analysis, adapted from industrial
models, involves studying in detail all the steps involved in providing a particular kind
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of care. It does not seek to identify errors in order to assign blame, but instead assumes
that faulty systems of care are very often responsible for errors. Fixing systems by
reducing unwarranted variations in the provision of care can be much more effective
in reducing errors than punishing people.
The argument from quality and the argument from consumer sovereignty are
not necessarily incompatible. The quality approach focuses on the technical
analysis of the sources of error in complex medical systems. The argument
from consumer sovereignty sees the value of surgeons’ report cards, not in
terms of the analytical value of the data, but as a means of introducing
incentives that reward doctors and institutions for good outcomes. Whether
the market effects of report cards for medical service providers advances or
hinders the goal of quality is a substantive empirical question, and the available
evidence is mixed.
UK government reforms requiring patients to be given a choice of hospitals
provide a case in point. The University College London Hospitals Trust
announced, in December 2005, that it would advertise for patients by claiming
that it has the lowest death rates in the National Health Service (Templeton,
2005). The claim is based on the findings of the independent health research
group Dr Foster. This kind of initiative aims to force hospitals to compete
on the grounds of safety and quality. However, it may turn out that link-
ing surgeons’ ‘market value’ to their mortality rates may introduce counter-
productive disincentives into the system. For instance, there is some evidence
from New York that cardiac surgeons are turning away some high-risk patients
who might benefit from surgery, in order to protect their published mortality
rates (Kolker, 2005). Similarly, Sir Bruce Keogh, president-elect of the Society
of Cardiothoracic Surgeons, has said that:
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the publication of mortality data in
England has had a negative effect on surgeons taking on high-risk cases . . . There will,
inevitably, be some people who don’t get an operation now, who might have got one in
the past. (Fracassini and Nutt, 2005)
I am sceptical about the idea that consumer preference, informed by access to
report cards, could be an effective mechanism for driving improvements in
surgical safety. However, the question of whether market mechanisms can
promote healthcare quality is not the subject of this paper. Rather, this paper
examines the argument from informed consent.
The argument from informed consent is important because it is independ-
ent of the argument from quality. The argument from informed consent
attempts to sidestep questions about the actual effects that report cards will
have on the healthcare system, by arguing that access to surgeon-specific
performance information falls within the ambit of an existing right. This is
not an argument that rests on empirical claims about the costs and benefits of
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performance reporting, but instead appeals directly to a general principle of
medical ethics – the principle of respect for patient autonomy.
I will argue that the informed consent argument for surgeon report cards is
actually fairly weak; too weak in fact to provide a sufficient justification for
developing a surgeon-specific outcomes reporting system. The right to such
information cannot be derived from the general requirement to respect patient
autonomy. Consequently, calls for a report card system need to be justified in
terms of their value for realizing improvements in quality and safety standards.
The idea that, as patients, we have a right to know about our surgeon’s
experience and success rates has an immediate appeal. It is the kind of demand
that follows naturally in the wake of revelations of clinical incompetence, and
indeed it did follow in the wake of the Bristol Royal Infirmary scandal. The UK
national paper, The Express, offered one of the more shrill responses to the
findings of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (Parker, 2001):
Not until we have eradicated a culture in which doctors can be more interested in
furthering their ambitions than in telling the truth about their success rate or a patient’s
chances, will we prevent another scandal like that at Bristol Royal infirmary happening
again.
It is important, however, not to conflate our right, as patients, to be protected
from medical negligence and incompetence, with a proposed right to have
fine-grained comparative performance information about all surgeons.
The argument from informed consent has been developed primarily by
Steve Clarke and Justin Oakley in their paper ‘Informed consent and surgeons’
performance’ (2004). My critique of the argument from informed consent will
focus on Clarke and Oakley’s paper. Their basic strategy is very straightforward.
It is uncontroversial, under the doctrine of informed consent, that the reason-
ably foreseeable risks of an operation must be disclosed to patients in the
consent process. Clarke and Oakley contend that relevant risk information
includes ‘information about the ability of available surgeons to perform the
operation in question’ (2004, p. 12):
Our main point is simple and, we think, very hard to deny. The risks that should be
disclosed to patients are the risks that we can reasonably expect that patients will face
when undergoing an operation. These risks will vary, inter alia, according to the level of
ability of the surgeons who are available to perform that operation. So, information
about the performance ability of surgeons is a necessary component of the disclosure of
the reasonably foreseeable risks of a surgical intervention. And, as the disclosure of the
reasonably foreseeable risks of a surgical intervention is a necessary requirement for
the provision of effective informed consent, the disclosure of information about the
performance ability of available surgeons is a necessary requirement for the provision of
effective informed consent to a surgical intervention. (2004, p. 12)
Clarke and Oakley stress that they accept the ‘received view’ that the moral
principle which grounds the doctrine of informed consent is respect for patient
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autonomy. They insist that the availability of surgeon report cards will give
patients more autonomy with respect to decisions about surgery:
We best uphold a patient’s autonomy by enabling that patient to properly understand
the risks that they are exposing themselves to when choosing to be operated on by a
particular surgeon. (2004, p. 13)
There are two problems with this argument. The first concerns Clarke and
Oakley’s use of the notion of ‘disclosure’. A medical practitioner’s obligation to
disclose information applies to information that she knows or should know –
crucially, information that is available. Standard obligations of disclosure
cannot be extended to generate an obligation to discover information that is
not presently known. Clarke and Oakley expand the obligation of disclosure in
a way that has counter-intuitive consequences. The second problem with their
argument is that it fails to respect a formal constraint on any argument from
autonomy – namely, that any substantive right derived from the principle of
respect for autonomy must be universalisable. I will consider these problems
in turn.
Clarke and Oakley point out that, where it is available, stratified risk
information is more relevant than very general risk information. For instance,
a risk algorithm such as the European System for Cardiac Operative Risk
Evaluation Score (EuroSCORE) takes into account a range of factors in
determining percentage predicted mortality for cardiac surgery. These risk
factors include age, gender, history of pulmonary disease, previous cardiac
surgery, unstable angina as well as 14 other criteria. If you were considering
consenting to a coronary artery bypass graft, you should be told your mortality
risk as predicted by an algorithm such as EuroSCORE, rather than merely
being told less ‘personalized’ information, such as the average mortality rate for
all cardiac patients. Clarke and Oakley tell us that ‘we ought to provide more
fine-grained information where it is available, because it more closely approx-
imates the actual probability of the relevant possible event’ (2004, p. 14).
The phrase ‘where it is available’ is misleading in this context. Clarke and
Oakley recognize that ‘a complete list of factors that can potentially affect the
probability that a risk may materialize would be extremely long, if not infinite’
and that this would be ‘impractical if not impossible’ (2004, p. 15). Having
noted, on pain of absurdity, that some restrictions must apply to the scope of
the disclosure obligation Clarke and Oakley do not give any sustained consid-
eration to the difficult question of how the appropriate boundary between
obligatory and supererogatory disclosure should be drawn. Instead, they assert
that a surgeon’s level of performance is a factor that many patients would
consider important. They further claim that:
Commonly, surgeons already maintain records of their performances in operations,
so it would not be an onerous administrative imposition to require that material
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information derived from such records be made available so that it may be provided to
patients for the purposes of enabling informed consent. (2004, p. 15)
Many surgeons may indeed keep detailed case notes. However, no individual
surgeon’s records can contain the kind of information that advocates of report
cards are calling for; that is, comparative risk information. It is important to
understand what is involved in meaningful comparative surgical audit.
Comparison of surgeons’ performance, with adequate risk adjustment to
account for case-mix, requires all units to collect and report data against a
uniform set of data standards, sufficient to apply a well-verified algorithm for
assessing pre-operative risk.
To gain a sense of the kind of research necessary to provide risk-adjusted
mortality comparisons for individual surgeons, consider the experience of the
Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons (SCTS) Britain. Anticipating the results of
the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, the SCTS instituted the collection of data
on surgeon specific activity and in-hospital mortality for several index proce-
dures (Keogh et al., 2004). The Society established a national database in 1994
which collects data on all adults undergoing cardiac surgery, beginning with
12 hospitals and now taking data from all NHS cardiac surgery units (SCTS,
2003). The main aim of the database was to develop reliable, UK-orientated
risk stratification models. In the UK the process of developing an agreed
minimum required dataset and standards for data reporting, and of bringing
all units into a centralized data collection system was a major project, requiring
national cooperation and considerable research and innovation. A study
designed to assess the quality and completeness of the SCTS database was
conducted by the SCTS in co-operation with the Nuffield Trust in Britain and
the RAND Heath Program in the United States. Sampling of the database
‘revealed it to be both incomplete and unreliable in its ability to yield accurate,
risk adjusted outcomes data’ (Fine et al., 2003, p. 28). Thus, when the SCTS
published surgeon specific results, in 2004, it did so on the basis of raw,
unadjusted mortality figures because it was not yet in a position to provide
validated risk-adjusted mortality rates (Keogh et al., 2004). Along with New
York State, the SCTS in the United Kingdom has been at the forefront of
surgical outcomes data collection in the world, and yet a decade of ground-
breaking work is only now bringing individualised outcomes reporting within
reach. The impressive work done by the SCTS in this area shows what is really
involved in providing meaningful, validated, risk-adjusted, comparative out-
comes data for individual surgeons. The suggestion that this kind of informa-
tion could be harvested from existing records without ‘onerous imposition’ is
rather too sanguine about the scale and analytical complexity of the task.
Once we acknowledge that determining risk-adjusted mortality rates for
individual surgeons requires the kind of nationally co-ordinated database
development that the SCTS has been engaged in since the early 1990s, it is
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immediately evident that it is misleading to talk about the ‘disclosure’ of such
information. The obligation to disclose risk information to a patient is relative
to the current state of medical knowledge. For almost any medical intervention
we could name, it is likely that future research will yield information that is not
currently available, but would be material to patients’ treatment decisions if it
were available. There may be obligations to undertake certain kinds of
research, but if research obligations exist they are not derived from disclosure
obligations. Standard obligations of disclosure do not generate any obligation
to produce new information that will require substantial work to discover.
Outside of those places where report cards systems are under development,
the information which Clarke and Oakley want to see published would require
a considerable research and infrastructure investment to produce. Resources
are scarce and there is any number of potential research and infrastructure
projects that could improve the understanding and treatment of disease (and
by extension the quality of informed consent to such treatment). The provision
of surgeon specific performance information may ultimately make an impor-
tant contribution to quality and safety in surgical practice, and so it may be
worthwhile to invest resources in the development of report cards. However, a
demand that surgeon report cards be made publicly available is a demand that
substantial resources be allocated to that end. To justify such a project, we need
to show that the benefits outweigh the costs.
I am not disputing the claim that comparative information about surgeons’
performance would be valuable, both for the profession and for some patients.
But no individual surgeon themselves can discover that information. Inter-
surgeon comparison requires comparison of their respective case-mix in terms
of a valid, standardized measure of patients’ pre-operative risk. The resource
expenditure required to produce comparative tables is not mandated by the
requirements of informed consent. Rather, a compelling argument for surgeon
report cards needs to justify the significant opportunity costs of developing
such a system.
The publication of risk adjusted mortality rates may promote transparency
in healthcare, but is of quite limited value in terms of patient safety. Because a
surgeon’s reputation and practice can be damaged, publicly reported outcomes
data must be thoroughly validated and reliable. In New York the validation
process typically means that data is 3 years old when it is published. Dated
information is of limited use for informed consent. The way to deal with sub-
standard surgeons is not to publish their poor results and hope that patients
will choose to avoid them. What is needed is a system of continuous audit that
identifies early signs of poor performance and calls surgeons and units to
account well before the evidence of excessive mortality has reached the con-
fidence level required for public reporting. In the UK the SCTS has adopted
that role. It should not be via adverse publicity that a problem surgeon first
comes to the attention of his or her hospital.
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Clarke and Oakley briefly consider concerns that the publication of sur-
geon report cards will lead to defensive medicine and cite evidence suggesting
that this has not happened in the case of New York. They then make the
striking claim that, even if turns out that the publication of surgeon report
cards does have ‘certain deleterious effects’ on the practice of medicine, their
publication might still be ethically justified. They note that different ethical
theories give different answers here, and while utilitarians will need to see a
cost/benefit balance sheet to make up their minds, ‘some Kantians might . . .
view this as a price worth paying in order to uphold respect for patient
autonomy’ (2005, p. 23).
I claimed above that Clarke and Oakley’s argument violates a formal
requirement on arguments based on the principle of respect for autonomy.
We now turn to this second problem with the argument from informed
consent. Their view that patient autonomy is enhanced by knowing the compara-
tive, risk-adjusted mortality of available surgeons is mistaken – particularly
on a Kantian conception of autonomy.
It is common to conflate autonomy with a broader and more consumerist
conception of individual choice, and a version of this confusion infects Clarke
and Oakley’s argument. According to Clarke and Oakley, the fact that a piece
of information is material to a patient’s decision about whether or not to
consent to an operation is not a sufficient condition for the patient having a
right to that information. A homophobic patient might consider the surgeon’s
sexual orientation material, but such information is protected by privacy
rights. However they suggest that ‘it is hard to see how this sort of rationale
could plausibly be applied to mount an argument for the withholding of
information about a surgeon’s performance’ (2005, p. 19).
The notion of a piece of information being ‘material’ to a patient’s decision
is essentially a legal concept. In the important Australian case of Rogers v
Whitaker the High Court found that a doctor has a duty of care to disclose
‘material’ risks, and stated that a risk is material if:
In the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position,
if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical
practitioner is, or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of
the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. (Skene and Smallwood, 2002)
Clarke and Oakley cite, with approval, the judgment in the case of Chappel v
Hart, to make the point that they endorse a subjective conception of materiality;
that is, information is material if the patient herself considers it material.
However, it is a mistake to hold that the principle of respect for autonomy
always weighs in favour of giving patients information they regard as material.
There are types of information that may be material to a patient’s decision, that
are not protected by privacy or other rights, and yet the patient has no
autonomy-based right to that information.
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The principle of autonomy is complex, but on any viable version of the
principle it involves a commitment to the moral equality of individuals. The
demand that others respect my autonomy implies a duty on my part to
reciprocate that respect towards others. For a Kantian, an agent acts autono-
mously only where she intends that her actions comply with the Categorical
Imperative, which means that it must be possible for all others, similarly
situated, to act in the same way. For the purpose of this argument, the relevant
constraint on autonomous decisions is roughly this: respect for a person’s
autonomy does not confer on her a right to arrogate to herself resources or
limited opportunities, where by so doing those resources or opportunities are
thereby denied to others. An example may help to illustrate the point.
Ms Scalpel is a surgeon whose overall performance is exceptionally good.
Suppose that the majority of her work consists of one procedure, normally
taking 3 hours, which she typically performs twice a day. She has kept metic-
ulous records and has discovered that her risk-adjusted mortality rate is
slightly better for the first operation of the day, in the morning, than for
patients who are operated on in the afternoon. Perhaps her concentration
and dexterity are diminished after several hours at the operating table. Her
overall long-run mortality rate is considerably better than average, and the
difference between the first and second operations of the day is slight. Suppose
that, other factors being equal, her afternoon patients have a 1% higher
probability of in-hospital mortality than her morning patients. Ms Scalpel
knows this fact about her performance. Does she have an obligation to disclose
to her patients the increased risk associated with her afternoon operations,
compared with her morning operations?
No she does not. At least there is no obligation to disclose this information
deriving from considerations of patient autonomy and informed consent. Any
patient who knew this fact, and had the option of choosing morning or
afternoon surgery, would rationally opt to be the first patient of the day. Yet
the option of a morning operation cannot be given to all of Ms Scalpel’s
patients, and no patient can claim that, on grounds of respect for autonomy,
she is entitled to a resource or an opportunity which cannot be made available
to other similarly situated patients. For this reason, a patient cannot, in the
name of informed consent, demand comparative performance information in
order to seek out an above average surgeon or unit. The purpose of informed
consent is not to help patients compete for undeserved advantage over other
patients.
A patient may well want the best surgeon in the state, but a patient whose
demand for the best surgeon is not met cannot thereby claim her autonomy
has been violated. In general, the principle of autonomy does not require us to
furnish patients with information to facilitate choices that are not universal-
isable. Importantly, a threshold model of publication of surgeon performance
information is compatible with a Kantian view of autonomy. Threshold reporting
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simply shows that a surgeon meets or fails to meet a specified performance
standard. A patient can reasonably demand evidence her surgeon is safe and
competent, and threshold reporting would fulfil that demand without com-
promising other patients.
It might be objected that providing information and providing an option are
not the same thing, and that a patient may want comparative performance
information for reasons other than selecting the best surgeon. A patient may
simply want to know, for instance, and in such a case would not providing such
information enhance autonomy? Even if we accept a subjective test for the
materiality of information, such that information is material just if a patient
regards it as material, it does not follow that respect for autonomy requires the
development of surgeon-specific performance tables. This conception of
informed consent only entitles patients to information that is both unpro-
tected and available. Where information is unavailable and costly to produce,
the mere fact that a patient would like to have that information does not
generate a claim on the public dollar.
Sir Bruce Keogh, co-ordinator of the National Adult Cardiac Surgery
Database in the UK (and president-elect of the SCTS) has noted that, if the
purpose of publishing individual surgeon performance information is for
patient choice, then the information must be presented in a comparative
fashion as detailed, risk-adjusted tables. However, publishing to indicate
whether a surgeon is safe or not ‘requires agreeing a threshold of unacceptable
mortality and then showing where each individual surgeon’s results lie relative
to that threshold’ (Keogh et al., 2004, p. 451). I have argued that considerations
of informed consent, at best, support a threshold model of surgeon perform-
ance reporting. Against Clarke and Oakley, I have argued that the doctrine of
informed consent in medical ethics does not require the publication of com-
parative performance information on surgeons of a kind that constitutes a
league table.
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